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Since Vladimir Putin first became President
of Russia in May 2000, the role of the Russian
Orthodox Church (ROC) in society and its ties
to the Russian government have grown. The
Church has demonstrated its increased influence by supporting changes in Russia’s public
policies, which now contradict the constitutional promise of secularism in Russia. The purpose
of this paper is to discuss several examples of
these changes and to show how the social mission of the ROC has influenced Russia’s foreign
and domestic policy in recent years.
The organization of the Church today differs
somewhat from its historical configuration, as
well as from those of non-Eastern Orthodox
churches generally. The ROC is one of fifteen
autocephalous hierarchical Orthodox churches,
which together make up the churches of Eastern
Orthodoxy. Unlike in Roman Catholicism, there
is no single earthly head of Eastern Orthodoxy.
The Eastern Orthodox churches are, however, in
full communion with one another, meaning that
priests from any of the churches are allowed to
minister to members of any of the other churches. Rather than maintaining an Eastern Orthodox papacy, each individual church has its own
primate, the head of the ROC being the Patriarch of Moscow and all Rus’. The current charter
of the ROC accords the Patriarch a number of
duties and grants him executive authority over
the Russian Church. Among his responsibilities
are upholding the unity of the Church’s hierarchy, representing the ROC in its relations with
state authorities, issuing decrees on the election
and appointment of diocesan bishops, and overseeing the maintenance and acquisition of the
Church’s property. Once attained, the rank of
Patriarch is held for life.
If we look back at the original promise
of secularity in the Russian Constitution, we can
see how it is contradicted by the current state of
affairs. Article 14 of Chapter 1 of the First Section of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, which was adopted by national referendum
on December 12, 1993 states, “1. The Russian

Federation shall be a secular state. No religion
may be established as the State religion or as
obligatory. 2. Religious associations shall be separate from the State and shall be equal before the
law.” Despite this decree, the Russian state and
the ROC have already formed a unique partnership that continues to have a substantial impact
on public policy in the Russian Federation today.
Before the establishment of the Russian
Federation in 1993, no government in the history of the Russian nation had claimed to represent
a secular state. Prior to the Bolshevik Revolution
of 1917, which brought into power an officially
atheistic Soviet Union, the state religion of the
Russian Empire was Russian Orthodox Christianity. The Tsar of Russia was the official head
of the Church, and held the title of Supreme
Defender of the Church. Before the Soviet government took possession of church buildings
in Russia, various groups and individuals had
owned them. The ROC owned some, but certainly not all. The Tsar’s court owned some. Local institutions owned others, and private estate
holders owned some as well. In the 1990s, Orthodox communities sprang up around historic
church buildings, and the ROC demanded (and
received) control of nearly all of those buildings.
Since 2000, that property has increasingly been
redistributed in favor of high-ranking members
of the clergy. This change is one small example
of many that illustrates the growing power of
ROC leaders in Russian society since the founding of the new Russian Federation.
The ROC has grown in membership over
the last couple of decades as well. According to
Interfax, the percentage of Russians going to
church has increased over the last 16 years from
57% to 71%. The change indicates that a growing
number identify with the Church in some way.
This interpretation is supported by other recent
polls. When asked what role the Church plays
in the country’s life, 73% of Russian respondents
said they were sure that the ROC plays a positive role, and only 2% disagreed with them. In
the same survey, 64% said they trust the Rus-
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sian Church and 56% said they trust Patriarch
Kirill. Of the respondents, 68% identified themselves as Russian Orthodox Christians. Clearly,
an increasing segment of the Russian populace
supports the ROC. As could be expected, this
influence has translated to increased economic
support for the ROC over that time as well. The
Church today has an elite support system that
is powerful in multiple sectors of society. Important bureaucrats, entrepreneurs and members of the intelligentsia favor public financing
“For the time being, the Russian Orthodox Church
and the Russian government are in a marriage of convenience. The Russian Orthodox Church is given free
rein to try to change social mores through public institutions like the media, films, the military, and the
educational curriculum. In return, the government
gets the support of what President Medvedev in February 2011 called ‘the largest and most authoritative
social institution in contemporary Russia.’”

and development of the ROC for reasons of cultural identity, despite the fact that many are not
churchgoers themselves.
The current state/church arrangement
can be described as follows: in exchange for certain benefits from the state, including increased
policy influence and economic opportunities, the
government of the Russian Federation receives
the legitimacy that ROC approval provides.
Professor of Political Science at the University of
Rhode Island and former US State Department
special assistant for policy on the Soviet Union
Nicolai Petro explains the situation like this:
The ROC’s increased influence can
be seen in Russia’s foreign policy. It may seem
strange, but the ROC now has a significant role
in Russia’s national security strategy. Although
much of the recent literature analyzing Russian
foreign policy has neglected to discuss state/
church collaboration, Patriarch Kirill and the
ROC now play a role in both formulating and
advancing Russian interests abroad. The ROC’s
work with the Russian Ministry of Foreign Af-
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fairs (MOFA) began in 2003 when then-Patriarch Alexey II officially visited Russia’s MOFA
for the first time. During that meeting, the ROC
and MOFA agreed to build a working relationship through a group dedicated to defending the
ROC’s activity abroad and forming policies that
would “deepen Russia’s ‘spiritual’ values.” As
Foreign Minister Lavrov put it, the new group
would enable the Church and Foreign Ministry
to work “together realizing a whole array of foreign policy and international activity thrusts.”
Resulting from this collaboration, the
notion of “spiritual values” and the need for
“spiritual restoration” have become frequent rhetorical refrains in the MOFA’s strategic planning
documents. For example, Russia’s 2003 National
Security Concept emphasized “spiritual restoration” as essential for combating the “negative
influence” of foreign religious organizations (including those that had already been working in
Russia for decades). Although the term “spirituality” seems generic, the objective of the policy
is clearly the restoration of Russian Orthodoxy
to a de facto state religion. At the same time, the
policy is designed so as to hinder the work of
foreign-based religious organizations in Russia,
which the ROC has referred to as threats to “the
integrity of [Russia’s] national consciousness and
cultural identity… and the spiritual and moral
ideal that is common to all of us.” This policy expanded under the leadership of President Medvedev and has continued into President Putin’s
third term.
Other examples show how Russia’s constitutional promise of secularism has been undermined since Putin’s ascension to power. For
example, one may note that President Putin and
the Church hierarchy spend quite a lot of time
together in public. Putin is frequently followed
by Church hierarchs (in full religious garb) at
undeniably political events, and is shown by
state media attending Church services on every
religious holiday. No other religious organiza-

tion has its services broadcast on national television. In addition, Orthodox chapels can now be
found in railroad stations and airports, with military units, and in police departments. It is also
now common for Orthodox priests to sanctify
banks, offices, homes, vehicles like tanks, ships
and airplanes, and even military weapons. An
ROC-endorsed course on “Orthodox Culture” is
now offered in many public secondary schools
even though similar courses are not taught for
other religions.
The ROC advocated public school teaching of the Orthodox Culture course, referred to
as “Foundations of the Orthodox Culture”, for
several years before its introduction under President Medvedev in 2007. But the ROC’s mission
for public education in Russia is much greater.
According to the contemporary Church’s most
comprehensive publication regarding its social
mission, the Bases of the Social Concept, “It
is desirable that the entire educational system
should be built on religious principles and based
on Christian values.” Considering the Church’s
stated mission in regards to education, it is quite
reasonable to expect that Church leaders will
affect other novel changes in the Russian public
education system over the coming years. We can
expect to see additional ROC-inspired changes
in Russian military policy as well.
The example of sanctifying state-owned
weapons is quite interesting. Since 2000 there
have been numerous reports of the Russian military utilizing the services of ROC clergy in this
manner. It is now not unusual for ROC priests to
bless the President’s nuclear launch code briefcase and to sprinkle holy water on S-400 Triumph
surface-to-air missile systems in ceremonies that
are then broadcast on national television. This
is particularly striking because officially the
Church objects to “consecrate[ing] places that
can serve a ‘double purpose’ and establishments
directly or indirectly encouraging sin.” Despite
this objection, not a single high-ranking ROC
priest has ever complained about the practice of

sanctifying weapons of mass destruction.
These are not the only examples of ROC
incursion into an ostensibly secular Russian military. In 2009, President Medvedev announced
that the government would support chaplains
representing Russia’s “traditional faiths” (including Islam, Judaism and Buddhism, in addition to Orthodoxy) while they provide religious
services to members of Russia’s armed forces.
While such a plan might seem non-discriminatory (putting aside for a moment the fact
that representatives of “non-traditional” faiths,
including protestant Christian denominations,
would not be accommodated), in reality the military was well prepared to reject the admission
of non-ROC chaplains, and it has done so by including a rule in the chaplaincy program that requires “adherents of a ‘traditional’ religious faith
to account for [a minimum of] ten percent of a
military unit before the state will authorize an
official chaplain.” Although many members of
Russia’s armed forces are not Orthodox Christians, very few military units are made up of
more than ten percent adherents of one of the
other three “traditional” religious groups. As a
result, the military hired nearly one thousand
full-time, paid ROC priests, but only two Muslim chaplains and one Buddhist chaplain as of
October 4, 2013. For years Patriarch Kirill has
advocated including Orthodox priests (to the
exclusion of other clergy) in Russia’s military, so
it is not surprising that he quickly praised President Medvedev’s plan, which is still in effect today under President Putin.
The ROC has also vocally supported
President Putin and the Russian Duma while
they place greater restrictions on the freedom
of expression in Russia. The recent case of the
punk rock protest group Pussy Riot, and the
change in policy resulting from it, illustrates the
ROC’s attitude towards speech that is critical
of the Church’s politics. On February 21, 2012,
"Russian Orthodox Church, Petropavlovsk"
Austronesian Expeditions
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five members of the protest group entered the
Cathedral of Christ the Savior in Moscow and
staged a performance on the altar, in which they
appealed to the Virgin Mary to “chase Putin
away.” Both regime officials and ROC leaders
were indignant following the group’s short but
unexpected concert in the cathedral. Foreign
Minister Lavrov called it “blasphemy”. Patriarch
Kirill said the group had made a “mockery of a
sacred place”. Others referred to the Pussy Riot
members as “prostitutes” and “satanic devils”
and called for them to be ripped to pieces on the
ancient execution site at Red Square.
Most Russian critics at the time failed
to notice that the “punk-prayer” was not directed against Orthodoxy in general, but specifically against the political role of the Orthodox
Church and its support for the Putin/Medvedev
regime. Several members of the band were put
on trial for the crime of “hooliganism motivated
by religious hatred,” which carries a maximum
sentence of seven years. On August 17, 2012,
three of the group’s most prominent members,
including Nadezhda Tolokonnikova and Maria Alyokhina were convicted and sentenced
to two years imprisonment. Amnesty International recognized the protesters as prisoners of
conscience, while the Union of Solidarity with
Political Prisoners recognized them as political
prisoners. No ROC leader has publically asked
for leniency or forgiveness on the part of the regime. Instead, Patriarch Kirill called on the government to criminalize blasphemy, which it did
on June 11, 2013. It is now a federal crime in
Russia to conduct public actions that insult the
feelings of religious believers, and the new criminal offense comes with a punishment of up to
three years in prison.
One of the complaints that the members of Pussy Riot cite as a motivation for their
performances is Church-supported government
policy that discriminates against sexual minorities. This final example of the ROC’s increased
influence in public policy is the one that has
gained the most international attention lately. In
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June 2013, President Putin signed into law a ban
on “propaganda of non-traditional sexual relations.” In short, the law says that any person who
is accused of promoting “non-traditional sexual
relations” is subject to criminal prosecution. As
a result of this law, anybody (including lawyers,
judges, and politicians) who argues in support of
gay equality can be fined.
Several international organizations have
protested the law, and numerous public figures
have criticized it. International boycotts have
been called against Russian vodka producers as
well as against the Winter Olympics in Sochi.
Patriarch Kirill, on the other hand, supported the bill in parliament and praised President
Putin for signing it into law, adding, “we must
do everything in our power to ensure that sin is
never sanctioned in Russia by state law, because
that would mean that the nation has embarked
on a path of self-destruction.” Although support
for the law is by no means limited to the Church
or its members, the Church’s strong promotion
of the law and years of actively supporting such
legislation has often been overlooked by both
Russian and international critics.
An understanding of the Church’s increased influence in Russia, especially since
President Putin’s first inauguration in 2000, is
essential for understanding recent changes in
public policy and for predicting future developments in Russian society. All of the policy
changes discussed here show that the Russian
government and the ROC are working together to undermine secularism in Russia. Despite
Russia’s constitutional guarantee of separation of
church and state, it seems that the regime and
the ROC have found it in their interests to put an
end to a very brief period of Russian secularism.
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